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PER SE IN TEXAS
Jessica Schauwecker*
S TEVEN Lipsky, a homeowner in Weatherford, Texas, sued Range
Resources Corporation (Range), an oil and gas exploration and
production company that had used hydraulic fracturing (fracking)
to drill two gas wells beneath the Lipsky home, for gross negligence and
nuisance upon discovering that he could light his well water on fire.' De-
spite the Texas Railroad Commission's determination that the gas in the
Lipsky well had leaked from the shallower Strawn formation, rather than
from the Barnett Shale formation, which lies more than a mile below the
well and into which the Range wells were drilled,2 Lipsky continued to
assert Range's fault in the matter, even after the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) inexplicably withdrew its administrative order against
Range.3 Meanwhile, Range moved to dismiss Lipsky's claims and filed
counterclaims against the homeowner for defamation, business dispar-
agement, and civil conspiracy.4
The trial court granted Range's motion to dismiss and denied Lipsky's
motion to dismiss the counterclaims under the Texas Citizens Participa-
tion Act (TCPA), an act that "protects citizens from retaliatory lawsuits
that seek to intimidate or silence them on matters of public concern." 5
On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed Range's civil con-
spiracy claim but upheld the claims against Lipsky for business disparage-
ment and defamation, finding that Range had satisfied the "clear and
specific evidence standard" to establish a prima facie case under the
TCPA.6 Both Range and Lipsky sought mandamus relief in the Texas Su-
* Jessica Schauwecker graduated from Southern Methodist University in 2012 with a
double major in Finance and Creative Writing. She was also a scholarship recipient on the
women's Division I varsity swim team. After graduation, she worked as a natural gas mar-
keter for two years before deciding to attend SMU Dedman School of Law. Jessica will
graduate from SMU Law in May 2017.
1. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584-85 (Tex. 2015).
2. Id. at 595.
3. Id. at 585-86.
4. Id. at 585.
5. Id. at 585-86.
6. Id. at 590-91.
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preme Court,7 which subsequently dismissed Range's business disparage-
ment claim for failure to establish economic loss by clear and specific
evidence. 8 However, despite Range's failure to provide more than con-
clusory statements of special damages, the court upheld the defamation
claim as defamation per se. 9
Because defamation per se, without proof of special damages, yields
only nominal damages to a successful plaintiff, the public generally
viewed the Texas Supreme Court's decision as a victory for Lipsky and a
strike against powerful oil and gas companies who would seek to suppress
free expression on matters of public concern, such as fracking. 10 Simi-
larly, the legal community focused primarily on the court's interpretation
of the "clear and specific evidence" standard under the TCPA and its
resolution of the previous split on the issue among Texas courts of ap-
peals. 1 The potential implications of the court's holding on Range's defa-
mation per se claim have been either overlooked or ignored. 1 2 While
defamation per se generally renders only nominal damages that, when
viewed in isolation, may have little impact on the defendant's financial
wellbeing, the viability of such suits by plaintiff corporations against indi-
viduals and the accompanying court and attorney costs may prove suffi-
cient to stanch free speech regarding certain matters of public concern
such as environmental harm, thereby directly negating the intended safe-
guards provided by the TCPA. 1 3 Thus, while the Texas Supreme Court's
interpretation of the TCPA and dismissal of Range's business disparage-
ment claim may have indeed provided an immediate victory for Steven
Lipsky, it may be that the court's new, broader application of defamation
per se will stifle under-supported allegations against fracking operations
and so prove an ultimate victory for the oil and gas industry.14
In Texas, the category of defamation per se pertaining to statements
that "adversely reflect on a person's fitness to conduct his or her business
or trade"' 5 has been traditionally limited in reach, including only those
statements that have a negative effect on some aspect peculiar to the per-
son's business or trade. 16 For example, describing a person as a "liar" or
"crook" is not defamatory per se, regardless of the person's occupation,
as such labels are not harmful in any specific business or trade, but rather
7. Id. at 586.
8. Id. at 593.
9. Id. at 595-96.
10. See, e.g., LakeSuperior, Lipsky Family Wins a Victory on Range Resources SLAPP
Law Suit at Texas Supreme Court, DA^ Y Kos (Apr. 27, 2015, 9:38 AM), http://www
.dailykos.com/story/2015/04/27/1380639/-Lipsky-FamiIy-Wins-a-Victory-Against-Range-
Resources-SLAPP-Law-Suit-at-Texas-Supreme-Court [http://perma.cc/54XT-M6KD].
11. See Laura Lee Prather & J. Jane Bland, Bullies Beware: Safeguarding Constitu-
tional Rights Through Anti-SLAPP in Texas, 47 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 725, 749 (2015).
12. See LakeSuperior, supra note 10.
13. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593.
14. See id.




reflect negatively upon the person's character in general. 17 Similarly, al-
leging that a merchant failed to pay a debt 18 or accusing a physician of
untruthfulness' 9 does not injure the person in his or her specific profes-
sion and so is not defamatory without proof of special damages. On the
other hand, alleging that a physician experimented with an illegal drug on
his patients without their consent is defamatory per se, as such a state-
ment directly injures the physician in his profession.20
The Texas Supreme Court's finding of defamation per se in Lipsky falls
beyond the narrow bounds drawn in prior case law.21 In contrast to the
court's lengthy discussion of the standard of proof under the TCPA, the
Lipsky court dealt with the issue of defamation per se in a single para-
graph.22 The court simply stated that, because "[e]nvironmental responsi-
bility is an attribute particularly important to those in the energy
industry-no more so than natural gas producers . . . who employ hori-
zontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing in their business," Lipsky's allega-
tion that Range's fracking contaminated his well water reflected
adversely on Range's fitness to produce natural gas.2 3 Yet, despite its
quick disposal of the issue, the court's holding regarding Range's defama-
tion counterclaim was not mere dicta. The finding of defamation per se
was essential to the outcome of the proceeding, as it alone prevented
complete dismissal of Range's claims against Lipsky.24 Thus, the court's
declaration that environmental accusations against fracking companies
are defamatory per se will bear precedential weight for future Texas
decisions.
Of course, there is no dispute that environmental responsibility is an
important aspect of oil and gas exploration and production. But surely
not only natural gas producers' businesses would be damaged by allega-
tions of environmental harm. Electricity generation, coal mining, agricul-
ture, and numerous other industries have generated public attention due
to possible adverse environmental impact.2 5 Even groundwater contami-
nation is not a problem specific to fracking. 26 Certainly well water pollu-
17. See Moore v. Waldrop, 166 S.W.3d 380, 384-85 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.);
Arant v. Jaffe, 436 S.W.2d 169, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, no writ); Billington v.
Hous. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 226 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950, no
writ).
18. World Car Nissan v. Abe's Paint & Body, Inc., No. 04-12-00457-CV, 2013 WL
3963700, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 31, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
19. Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex. 2013).
20. Post-Newsweek Stations, Hous., Inc. v. Dugi, No. 13-10-00366-CV, 2011 WL
2463057, at *10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 16, 2011, pet. dism'd) (mem. op.).
21. See Billington, 226 S.W.2d at 496.
22. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 596 (Tex. 2015).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See World's Top 10 Toxic Pollution Problems, CONSERVE ENERGY FUTURE, http://
www.conserve-energy-future.com/top-10-worst-toxic-pollution-problems.php [http://perma
.cc/WR9Y-V6X4].
26. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Contaminants Found in Groundwater, U.S. GEO-
LOGICAL SURVEY, http://water.usgs.gov/edu/groundwater-contaminants.html [http://perma
.cc/UK7C-P8RA]. Industries including ceramics, plastics, and synthetic fibers manufactur-
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tion would not tie as specifically to fracking as illegal drug
experimentation on patients would to the work of a physician. 27
Furthermore, although false allegations of groundwater contamination
would likely result in public disapproval of Range and its fracking opera-
tions, Range does not sell or deal directly in business with the public at
large.28 As an exploration, production, and transportation company,
Range primarily drills, produces, and transports crude oil, natural gas,
and natural gas liquids to processing plants and intermediary markets,
which then resell the finished products to vendors and consumers as fuel
and other commodities. 29 Thus, while Lipsky's accusations might have
some minor effect on Range's relationship with public investors,30 any
damage to Range's public reputation would be unlikely to directly affect
the company's profits or detrimentally to impact its contracts with down-
stream purchasers, who are more likely to recognize the falsity of the
accusation and unlikely to end their relationship with Range due to one
instance of environmental contamination. Similarly, Lipsky's communica-
tion with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was not likely to
cause significant harm to Range's business if the accusations proved false,
as the EPA was required to, and did, conduct an independent study
before assuming fault.31
Not only does the court's holding in Lipsky broaden the scope of state-
ments considered to adversely affect a person in his or her business, but it
may also place accusations of environmental harm more definitively
within that category of defamation per se than does prior Texas case
law. 32 In Waste Management of Texas, Inc. v. Texas Disposal Systems
Landfill, Inc., Waste Management, a waste-removal and landfill-services
company, sent a written "Action Alert" to environmental and community
leaders in Austin, Texas, alleging that Texas Disposal, a competitor com-
pany, was environmentally unsound in its operations and that Texas Dis-
posal's landfill contract with the City of San Antonio would therefore
lead to environmental problems. 33 Despite the evident tendency of these
statements to adversely affect Texas Disposal in its business as a landfill
services provider, especially given the station of the recipients of the Ac-
tion Alert and Waste Management's express intent to upset the contract
ing, municipal waste disposal, steel processing, and farming utilize harmful chemicals that
may pollute groundwater by leaching through soil. See id.
27. See Post-Newsweek Stations, Hous., Inc. v. Dugi, No. 13-10-00366-CV, 2011 WL
2463057, at *10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 16, 2011, pet. dism'd) (mem. op.).
28. See Operations, RANGE REiSouizoas, http://www.rangeresources.com/operations
[http://perma.cc/9U7K-JBDM].
29. See Strategy, RANGE RESOURCES, http://www.rangeresources.com/company/strat-
egy [http://perma.cc/EYC2-39X6].
30. See Investors, RANGE RESOURCE's, http://ir.rangeresources.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=
101196&p=irol-irhome [http://perma.cc/H9LP-HKRB].
31. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Tex. 2015).
32. See Waste Mgmt. of Tex. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., No. 03-10-00826-CV,
2012 WL 1810215, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin May 18, 2012, pet. granted) (mem. op.), rev'd




between San Antonio and Texas Disposal and thus eliminate Texas Dis-
posal as a competitor, the court did not immediately declare the Action
Alert defamatory per se.34 Instead, the court ruled that the question of
defamation per se should be submitted to the jury, as there were "under-
lying fact issues regarding whether Waste Management's Action Alert
was defamatory per se-i.e., whether the meaning and effect of the words
in the Action Alert tended to affect Texas Disposal injuriously in its busi-
ness."' 35 Surely if such direct statements regarding a landfill company's
environmental integrity, explicitly intended to deprive the company of
contracted business and directed to the attention of persons with particu-
lar interest and power to influence decision-making, required a jury to
determine whether or not the statement adversely reflected on the com-
pany's fitness to conduct business, then Lipsky's allegation of a single in-
stance of groundwater pollution by Range merits some hesitation as to
whether defamation per se should apply.36
Even if the Lipsky decision has not significantly expanded the category
of defamation per se involving statements adversely reflecting upon a
person in his or her business or trade, allegations against natural gas pro-
ducers of causing environmental harm through fracking should not be
held defamatory without proof of special damages on account of the
sheer number of potential claims to which such holding could give rise.
The environmental effects of fracking are subjects of hot debate through-
out the United States.37 Fracking has been blamed not only for ground-
water contamination, but also for causing air pollution, health defects,
and even earthquakes. 38 Texas nonprofit and political groups have
banded against proposed and current fracking operations, organizing and
conducting protests and garnering media attention.39 In November 2015,
34. Id. Waste Management's direction of the Action Alert to environmental and com-
munity leaders may bear some factual similarity to Lipsky's communication with the EPA
regarding the well water contamination. See id.; Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 585. However, un-
like environmental activists, who might presume blame and take immediate action upon
notice of an environmental threat, the EPA, as a government agency, was required to, and
did in fact, investigate the source of contamination before taking action against Range. See
Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 585. Furthermore, Lipsky's primary motivation in reporting the con-
tamination to the EPA was to remedy the environmental harm through either injunction or
damages, whereas Waste Management's express aim in defaming Texas Disposal was to
disparage Texas Disposal's business reputation and eliminate the company as a competitor.
See id.; Waste Mgmt., 2012 WL 1810215, at *1.
35. Waste Mgmt., 2012 WL 1810215, at *1.
36. See id.; Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 585.
37. See, e.g., Coalition Members, AMERICANS AGAINsT FRACKING, http://www.ameri-
cansagainstfracking.org/about-the-coalition/members/#National Organizations [http://per
ma.cc/PK2J-7VXJ].
38. See William L. Ellsworth, Injection-Induced Earthquakes, 341 SCIENCE 1225942, at
*1 (2013), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/341/6142/1225942 [http://perma.cc/2S8E-
HHWY]; Joe Hoffman, Potential Health and Environmental Effects of Hydrofracking in
the Williston Basin, Montana, NAGT GEOLOGY AN!) HUMAN HEALTH (2012), http://
serc.carleton.edu/NAGTWorkshops/health/case-studies/hydrofrackingw.html [http://per
ma.cc/6ZRP-9GM4].
39. See, e.g., NORTH CENTRAL TEXAS COMMUNrrEs ALLIANCE, http://www.nctca.net
[http://perma.cc/6K86-3VZD]; FRAcDALLAS, http://fracdallas.org [http://perma.cc/KZN8-
4Q9E]; see also Luke Metzger, Fracking on UT Lands Pollutes Air and Water, ENVIRON-
2016]
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Denton community activists were successful in persuading the city council
to pass a temporary ban on fracking operations.40
In jurisdictions outside of Texas, homeowners and community organi-
zations have filed lawsuits seeking damages and injunctions against com-
panies conducting fracking operations. 41 Plaintiffs have filed claims of
nuisance and trespass, alleging that fracking has contaminated both
groundwater and air,42 as well as claims of negligence and nondisclosure
of material facts regarding the chemicals contained in fracking fluid and
their potential to cause harmful environmental and health effects.43 The
decisions in such suits have varied, with some courts declining to grant
monetary or injunctive relief when the claimed harm remains conclusory
and unproven, 44 while other courts have willingly sustained verdicts
against defendant natural gas producers. 45 The prevalence of public and
media debate over the purported harms of fracking has had some impact
on the outcomes of these legal disputes, especially in jury trials.46 For
example, in Hiser v. XTO Energy, Inc., a case arising from an Arkansas
homeowner's allegations that XTO's natural gas drilling had caused dam-
aging vibrations on his property, the Eighth Circuit sustained a jury ver-
dict against XTO, despite the jurors' discussion of "extra-record
evidence" and preconceived notions that earthquakes could be caused by
fracking. 47
While Texas courts have not yet been inundated by claims of environ-
mental damage from fracking, possibly because of the state's economic
interest in the oil and gas industry and vast shale reserves that can only be
accessed by fracking, it is merely a matter of time before expanding natu-
ral gas production spawns more lawsuits by homeowners and activists.48
However, the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Lipsky may deter poten-
tial plaintiffs from seeking to recover damages for nuisance or trespass, or
even from reporting negative effects of fracking to the media or EPA.49 It
MENT TEXAS (Sep. 8, 2015), http://environmenttexas.org/news/txe/report-fracking-ut-lands-
pollutes-air-and-water [http://perma.cc/9CQ8-RZHV].
40. See Max B. Baker, Denton City Council Repeals Fracking Ban, Tiii SrAR-Ti-.i
GRAM, June 16, 2015, http://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/barnett-shale/article246
27469.html [http://perma.cc/479V-F6RB]; see also 10 Reasons to Ban Fracking in Denton,
FRACK FRIA, DIiNTON, http://frackfreedenton.com/ten-reasons-to-ban-fracking-in-denton
[http://perma.cc/DJL6-E4GX].
41. Hiser v. XTO Energy, Inc., 768 F.3d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 2014); see, e.g., Dine Citi-
zens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Jewell, No. CIV 15-0209 JB/SCY, 2015 WL 4997207, at
*1 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015) (slip copy).
42. See Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., Nos. 1:11-CV-44-DPM, 1:l1-CV-45-DPM, 2012 WL
528253, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012).
43. See Mangan v. Landmark 4 LLC, No. 1:12 CV 613, 2013 WL 950560, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 11, 2013).
44. See Tucker, 2012 WL 528253, at * 1.
45. See Hiser, 768 F.3d at 773.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 775.
48. See Rhiannon Meyers, Texas' Oil and Gas Industry Expands to Near-Record
Levels, FUEL- Fix (July 24, 2014), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2014/07/24/texas-oil-and-gas-indus-
try-expands-to-record-levels [http://perma.cc/5J26-DHYQJ.
49. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 596 (Tex. 2015).
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is true, of course, as those who declared victory for Lipsky after the Texas
Supreme Court's decision so aptly observed, that a finding of defamation
per se, with no proof of economic harm, can yield at most an award of
nominal damages, which are unlikely to set a defendant back more than a
few dollars. 50 But in addition to nominal damages, the defendant against
a claim of defamation per se by a corporate plaintiff incurs attorney's fees
and court costs and also risks much larger special damages if the company
is able to prove economic harm.51 Thus, homeowners and nonprofit orga-
nizations may choose to refrain from allegations against fracking compa-
nies, even upon clear evidence of adverse environmental effects, under
the looming threat of a defamation counterclaim and its associated
costs. 52 Surely this deterrent counteracts the protection of public interest
speech intended under the Texas Citizens Participation Act and the Act's
construal by the court in Lipsky.
53
Frivolous lawsuits are a burden on Texas courts both temporally and
financially. 54 Meritless claims waste the time and money of both the judi-
ciary and litigants and further burden the state's already-congested
courts.55 On the other hand, legitimate suits should not be barred by
overwhelming costs and hurdles, and prohibitions on speech related to
public interest-speech that is protected under the First Amendment-
should not be imposed lightly.56 The Texas Supreme Court's holding in
Lipsky constitutes an unprecedented expansion of a traditionally narrow
category of defamation per se.57 Given the continuing growth of instate
drilling for natural gas, discouraging good faith allegations of environ-
mental harm, even when such allegations ultimately prove false, may
stanch public debate over the risks and benefits of fracking. Accusations
of pollution by oil and gas companies are all too commonplace amidst
today's swell of environmentalism. 58 Even if such statements do tend ad-
versely to reflect on a natural gas producer's fitness to conduct business,
companies should be required to produce evidence of special damages
before such statements become actionable. 59 False accusations of envi-
ronmental harm, especially within the context of fracking, should not be
sheltered under the blanket of defamation per se.
50. See id. at 596 ("As defamation per se, damages to its reputation are presumed,
although the presumption alone will support only an award of nominal damages.").
51. See generally Kelly Davis, Levying Attorney Fees Against Citizen Groups: Towards
the Ends of Justice?, 39 TEX. ENVTi. L.J. 39, 39 (2008).
52. See generally id.
53. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590-91.
54. See Chris Colby, There's a New Sheriff in Town: The Texas Vexatious Litigants
Statute and Its Application to Frivolous and Harassing Litigation, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1291, 1292 (2000).
55. See id.
56. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
57. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 596.
58. See, e.g., FRACDALLAS, http://fracdallas.org [http://perma.cc/AV4M-VLEZ].
59. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593.
20161
290 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
